- Court
- Court of Appeals of Georgia
- Year
- 2025
- Case
- Schriver v. N. Fulton Emergency Physicians, LLC
- Citation
- 377 Ga. App. 297
- Decided
- October 21, 2025
A physician supplied by a staffing company was an independent contractor where the contract designated her that way and the company did not control the time, manner, or method of her work. The common-law presumption of independent-contractor status applied separately from OCGA 51-2-5.1.
Summary
The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed summary judgment for North Fulton Emergency Physicians, LLC in Schriver v. N. Fulton Emergency Physicians, LLC. The trial court ruled that the staffing company could not be vicariously liable for an emergency-room physician’s alleged negligence because the physician was an independent contractor.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the lack of control over the physician’s time, manner, and method of work.
Issues Decided
Vicarious liability and independent-contractor status
Decision
The court held that the staffing company was not vicariously liable because the physician was an independent contractor under Georgia’s right-to-control test.
Facts
Brian Schriver died about 24 hours after being treated and discharged from a hospital emergency department by a physician supplied by North Fulton Emergency Physicians. His wife sued the staffing company on a vicarious-liability theory.
The contract was titled “Physician Independent Contractor Agreement” and stated that the physician was not an employee. It also provided that the staffing company would not control the methods or time of the physician’s professional functions. The company’s corporate representative testified that it did not dictate how physicians exercised medical judgment. On scheduling, the physician submitted available dates and blackout dates.
Reasoning
Georgia’s test asks whether the alleged employer controls the time, manner, and method of the work. The court found no control over medical judgment and no sufficient control over scheduling. It compared the case to prior Georgia authority involving similar emergency-physician staffing arrangements.
Common-law independent-contractor presumption
Decision
The court held that the common-law presumption of independent-contractor status applied even if OCGA 51-2-5.1 did not govern the staffing-company relationship.
Facts
The plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly relied on language resembling OCGA 51-2-5.1, which is directed to hospital-healthcare professional relationships.
Reasoning
The Court of Appeals explained that Georgia common law independently recognizes a rebuttable presumption that a contract’s independent-contractor designation reflects the true relationship unless the record shows actual control.
Commentary
The opinion highlights the evidence problem in vicarious-liability claims against physician staffing companies. Contract language matters, but the deeper question is actual control over clinical judgment and scheduling.
For plaintiffs, the useful discovery target is not the label in the contract. It is evidence that the staffing company controlled medical decision-making, shift obligations, policies with teeth, discipline, or other details of the physician’s work. Without that kind of control evidence, summary judgment is a serious risk.
