- Court
- Court of Appeals of Georgia
- Year
- 2024
- Case
- Sangster v. McGillivary
- Citation
- 373 Ga. App. 381; 908 S.E.2d 393; 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 440
- Decided
- October 29, 2024
The five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions is not overcome by Georgia's renewal statute, but the trial court must reconsider on remand whether the statute of repose was tolled by the COVID-19 pandemic judicial emergency order under the principles established in Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management.
Summary
The Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Sangster’s medical malpractice renewal action as barred by the five-year statute of repose. The court held that while the renewal statute does not create an exception to the statute of repose, the trial court must reconsider on remand whether the statute was tolled by the statewide judicial emergency order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, following the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management.
Issues Decided
Whether the Renewal Statute Creates an Exception to the Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose
Decision
The court held that the renewal statute does not create an exception to the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. A properly filed renewal action stands on the same footing as the original action with respect to statutes of limitation, but the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the five-year statute of repose. The statute of repose is absolute and destroys the previously existing right of action upon expiration.
Facts
Sangster underwent a carpal tunnel operation on April 24, 2018. She filed her original medical malpractice complaint on February 24, 2020, but the trial court involuntarily dismissed it without prejudice on July 13, 2023, for want of prosecution. Sangster filed a renewal action on August 16, 2023. The five-year statute of repose expired on April 24, 2023, before the renewal action was filed. McGillivary moved for summary judgment arguing the renewal action was barred by the statute of repose, and the trial court granted the motion.
Reasoning
The court applied plain language statutory interpretation to OCGA § 9-3-71(b) and OCGA § 9-2-61(a). The statute of repose explicitly states “in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.” The court found nothing in the plain language of either statute that distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary dismissals. Sangster’s argument that her involuntary dismissal should be treated differently failed because the statutory text contains no such distinction. The court noted that prior Georgia case law established that the statute of repose stands as an unyielding barrier and is absolute, and that the legislature never intended the renewal statute to overcome it.
Whether the Statute of Repose Was Tolled by the COVID-19 Judicial Emergency Order
Decision
The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the statute of repose was tolled by the statewide judicial emergency order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, under the principles established in Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management.
Facts
After the trial court issued its order granting summary judgment and after the appeal was filed, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management and determined that the COVID-19 pandemic judicial emergency order could toll the statute of repose.
Reasoning
The court recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management, issued after the trial court’s ruling, established new law regarding tolling of the statute of repose by the judicial emergency order. Because this intervening Supreme Court decision could affect the outcome of Sangster’s case, the court found it necessary to remand for the trial court to apply the tolling principles from Golden to the facts of this case.
Commentary
For plaintiff lawyers evaluating medical malpractice renewal actions in Georgia, this decision underscores a critical procedural trap: the five-year statute of repose is not overcome by the renewal statute, even when the original action was involuntarily dismissed. The court’s plain-language analysis found no statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary dismissals, meaning that a plaintiff whose case is dismissed for want of prosecution after years of litigation faces the same repose bar as one who voluntarily nonsuited. This holding narrows the practical utility of renewal filings in medical malpractice cases and highlights the importance of case management and timely prosecution to avoid dismissal before the repose deadline.
The remand for tolling analysis under Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Management introduces a potential lifeline, but one whose contours remain uncertain on remand. The opinion does not specify what factual or legal showing will satisfy the tolling inquiry or how the trial court should apply Golden’s principles to Sangster’s particular timeline and circumstances. Plaintiff counsel should be prepared to develop a detailed factual record regarding the impact of the COVID-19 judicial emergency order on court operations and case progression during the relevant period, as the trial court will need to make specific findings to support any tolling determination.
