- Court
- Supreme Court of Georgia
- Year
- 2026
- Case
- Ga. Bone & Joint Surgeons, P.C. v. Keel
- Citation
- 323 Ga. 556, 926 S.E.2d 48, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 49 (2026)
- Decided
- February 3, 2026
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In concurrence, Justice Bethel wrote that Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group does not require trial courts to instruct juries on how to evaluate expert testimony about personal medical practices, and that whether a requested charge is or is not a pattern instruction cannot alone justify granting or denying it.
Summary
The Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari in a medical malpractice case in which the trial court refused a requested jury instruction about evaluating expert testimony regarding personal medical practices. The useful part of the order is Justice Bethel’s concurrence, which explains that the Court’s prior decision in Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group does not mandate such an instruction and that pattern-instruction status alone cannot decide whether a requested charge should be given.
Issues Decided
Whether Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group requires trial courts to instruct juries on evaluating expert testimony about personal medical practices
Decision
Justice Bethel wrote that Condra does not require trial courts to instruct juries on how to evaluate expert testimony about an expert’s personal medical practices. The holding in Condra was limited to the narrow question of whether such testimony is admissible; Condra’s discussion of jury instructions to prevent juror confusion was not necessary to its holding and therefore does not bind trial courts to give such instructions.
Facts
The trial court in this case rejected the defendant’s requested jury instruction addressing how jurors should evaluate testimony about an expert’s personal practices when assessing the applicable standard of care and whether it was breached. The Court of Appeals concluded that any error in refusing the instruction was harmless. The defendant petitioned for certiorari, arguing that Condra required the trial court to give the instruction.
Reasoning
Justice Bethel’s concurrence applies the principle that “the holding of a particular decision is limited to the reasoning that was necessary to that decision.” Condra addressed only the admissibility of personal-practices testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702(c) (the current codification of the statute Condra construed), which permits such evidence “as substantive evidence and to impeach the expert’s opinion regarding the applicable standard of care.” Condra’s discussion of jury instructions to remedy potential juror confusion was dicta—reasoning not necessary to resolve the admissibility question. The petitioner’s reading of Condra as requiring such an instruction “is disjointed from the narrow issue we actually addressed.”
Whether trial courts must follow pattern jury instructions or may tailor charges to the evidence and law
Decision
Justice Bethel also wrote that trial courts are not bound by pattern jury instructions and may tailor or deviate from them when appropriate to the evidence and applicable law. The legal standard requires only that a jury charge be “adjusted to the evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.” Whether a charge is or is not consistent with pattern instructions cannot alone be a legitimate reason to grant or deny an otherwise appropriate charge.
Facts
The trial court here refused the requested instruction on several grounds, including that it was not a pattern jury instruction. The concurrence notes that the Court of Appeals has at times, in reviewing claims of instructional error generally, focused on whether a given charge was consistent with Georgia’s Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions. The trial court also found the proposed instruction “very hard to follow,” repetitive of the standard-of-care charge, and ultimately unnecessary.
Reasoning
Pattern jury instructions are not law and are not an authoritative interpretation of law; they represent best practices developed by the Council of Superior Court Judges. Trial courts have a duty to charge the jury on applicable law supported by the evidence, which may require modifying or tailoring a pattern charge. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously found error in pattern charges and has concluded on more than one occasion that a pattern charge was simply wrong. Whether a charge is consistent with pattern instructions “sheds no light on whether the charge is a correct and complete statement of law.” Trial courts should not hesitate to deviate from pattern instructions where the evidence or legal issues warrant a specially tailored charge, though they are not required to give such an instruction in every case.
Commentary
This is a companion development to the Court of Appeals decision in Keel. For plaintiff lawyers evaluating expert-testimony issues in medical malpractice cases, Justice Bethel’s concurrence clarifies an important limitation on Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group. The concurrence’s point that Condra’s discussion of jury instructions was dicta means that trial courts cannot be forced to give a personal-practices instruction simply by citing Condra. But it also signals that trial courts have discretion to give such instructions when the evidence warrants them, and that refusal based solely on the instruction’s deviation from pattern charges is not a sound basis for denial. Plaintiff lawyers seeking a personal-practices instruction should therefore frame the request on evidentiary and case-specific grounds rather than relying on Condra as a mandate.
The opinion also reinforces a procedural point relevant to appellate review: consistency with pattern instructions is not a measure of legal correctness. Trial courts that refuse a tailored instruction on the ground that it is not a pattern instruction are applying an improper standard. Plaintiff lawyers preserving error on instructional refusals should therefore distinguish between the trial court’s stated reasons—if the court relied on the non-pattern status alone—and the legal sufficiency of the proposed charge. The concurrence’s citation to cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court found pattern charges themselves to be erroneous underscores that pattern status confers no immunity from appellate scrutiny.
