- Court
- Court of Appeals of Georgia
- Year
- 2026
- Case
- Coll v. Kelly
- Citation
- Case No. A26A0830, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 252
- Decided
- May 22, 2026
A musculoskeletal radiologist is not a member of the same profession as a chiropractor and so cannot support a 9-11-9.1 affidavit as to chiropractic treatment, but under OCGA § 43-9-16(g) a chiropractor who takes and reads an X-ray is held to the same standard of care as a physician. Because the radiologist was qualified to opine on the X-ray standard, his affidavit was sufficient to defeat dismissal, and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety.
The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Christy Coll’s medical malpractice complaint against Dr. John Kelly, a licensed chiropractor, holding that her expert affidavit was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on one of her two theories. The case is a clean illustration of how OCGA § 43-9-16(g) reshapes the “same profession” affidavit analysis whenever a chiropractor performs an act that is also a standard medical procedure.
The procedural posture is a dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-9.1. As the opinion describes it, Coll saw Kelly in August 2022 for neck and shoulder pain. Kelly took an X-ray, but part of the spine area was obscured by Coll’s necklace, and he did not repeat the X-ray before manipulating her spine; she immediately experienced sharp pain that ultimately required additional care. She sued for professional negligence, alleging Kelly breached the standard of care in taking and reading the X-ray. Her complaint was supported by an affidavit from Dr. Jeremy Royal, a musculoskeletal radiologist, who opined that Kelly deviated by relying on a single obscured image — portions of the C7 vertebral body were not visible — and that Coll was later diagnosed with discitis/osteomyelitis in the obscured area. Kelly moved to dismiss, arguing that Royal was not trained in chiropractic and could not opine on chiropractic care, though he conceded Royal could address the standard for reading an X-ray. The trial court dismissed the whole complaint, finding Royal unqualified.
The Court of Appeals split the affidavit in two. To the extent Royal opined that Kelly’s chiropractic treatment fell below the standard of care, or that the chiropractic treatment caused the injury, he was not competent: OCGA § 9-11-9.1(g) lists chiropractors separately from medical doctors, and under the “member of the same profession” rule a radiologist cannot testify to the chiropractic standard of care. But Coll also offered Royal’s opinion on a different theory — that Kelly’s decision to treat her flowed from a failure to follow the standard of care in taking and reading the X-ray. There, OCGA § 43-9-16(g) controls: when a chiropractor performs an act that “also constitutes a standard procedure of the practice of medicine,” including X-rays, the chiropractor “shall be held to the same standard of care as would licensed doctors of medicine.” Kelly conceded Royal was qualified on that standard. Construing the affidavit most favorably to Coll, as the motion-to-dismiss posture requires, the panel held Royal’s affidavit satisfied OCGA §§ 9-11-9.1 and 24-7-702(c)(2) on the X-ray theory, and the trial court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety.
The practical lesson is narrow but useful. Section 9-11-9.1 is a pleading requirement, not a proof requirement; the affidavit need only be enough to survive a motion to dismiss, construed in the plaintiff’s favor. For plaintiffs suing chiropractors, § 43-9-16(g) opens the door to physician experts whenever the chiropractor performed an act — an X-ray, or another procedure the statute reaches — that is also a standard procedure of the practice of medicine. The panel was careful to add that it “express[ed] no opinion as to whether this alleged breach caused Coll’s injuries.” This is a ruling about getting past the pleadings, not about the merits.
